A candidate's fate depends only on the behaviour of two links of london bangles-vane' committee members. Committee members may vote against favoured candidates if the weather-vane is opposed; enthusiastic assessments by one of these weather-vanes may harm a candidate's chances by increasing others' thresholds for hiring him; sunk time costs may lead voters who voted against hiring to vote for tenuring him, even after a poor probationary performance. For two member committees that are patient and perceptive, the optimal voting rule is a (weak) links of london bracelets at the hiring stage and unanimity at the tenure stage; when such committees are impatient or imperceptive, the double (weak) majority rule is optimal. Perversely, the performance of a patient, imperceptive committee improves as its perceptiveness further declines. Consistent with practice, falling threshold rules are not optimal. Results on optimal voting rules are also presented in limit cases as committee members' beliefs become more correlated. Finally, we links of london charms the model to a discrete-time European options model.This article departs from the traditional welfare analysis of social status seeking by incorporating scale economies, product differentiation, and monopolistic competition into a model. I argue that social status seeking could be welfare improving rather than the links of london necklaces conclusion that social status seeking is welfare-reducing, under some assumptions that are not particularly strong.
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